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Trust Model for Certificate Revocation in Ad hoc Networks 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we propose a distributed trust model for certificate revocation in Ad-
hoc networks. The proposed model allows trust to be built over time as the number 
of interactions between nodes increase. Furthermore, trust in a node is defined not 
only in terms of its potential for maliciousness, but also in terms of the quality of 
the service it provides. Trust in nodes where there is little or no history of 
interactions is determined by recommendations from other nodes. If the nodes in 
the network are selfish, trust is obtained by an exchange of portfolios. Bayesian 
networks form the underlying basis for this model.    
 
1 Introduction 
An Ad hoc wireless network or Manet (Mobile Ad hoc NETwork) is formed dynamically 
by a group of moving nodes. It has no infrastructure and the network has no backbone or a 
central point of communication [8]. Such networks find applications in scenarios where it 
is very difficult to establish base stations and where timely updating and maximum 
mobility is required. These include conferences, military battlefields, disaster/rescue 
operations, civil enforcement and home networking. The devices operating in an ad hoc 
network have limited energy. Hence any protocol or administrative operation must be 
devised with a view of minimizing the battery usage. The limited battery power may make 
the nodes in the network selfish, i.e. they may not forward or reply to some messages in 
order to save battery power.   
The two main challenges facing ad hoc wireless networks are quality of service and 
security. The nodes in the ad hoc network operate over wireless media making them highly 
vulnerable to attacks and the limited bandwidth results in degraded quality of service. 
Various techniques have been proposed to ensure security and Quality of Service. For 
example, in order to ensure security, each node in the network may be authenticated using 
cryptographic techniques supported by a certificate authority (CA). Rather than propose 
new security or Quality-of-Service mechanisms, in this paper we investigate the role of 
trust in ensuring security and good service. All nodes in the network should not be 
considered to be equally trustworthy from a security or service perspective. To ensure a 
reliable network, it is essential to identify nodes which are trustworthy and those which are 
unreliable from a security or a service aspect.  
This paper introduces a Bayesian network trust model for ad hoc networks which is 
based on the localized trust model introduced in [6]. Establishing trust among the nodes in 
an ad hoc network is very important from a security standpoint as the nodes act as self 
securing devices to protect themselves without any infrastructural support. Furthermore, 
nodes route packets to a destination through intermediate nodes.  Hence, nodes need 
assurance to rely on other nodes in the network and this is achieved by establishing trust 
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relationships among the nodes. The model discussed in this paper establishes trust 
relationships among the nodes in the network; the trust values are propagated and evolved 
in the network with the help of the Bayesian model that each node maintains for every 
other node in the network. Trust in this work is defined both from a quality perspective, 
that is, the quality of a node as a service provider, and from a security perspective, that is, 
the maliciousness of a node. A good trust model should be scalable; it should have an 
extensive adversary control mechanism and should establish trust among the nodes. 
However, establishing trust relationships among the nodes involves communication 
overheads. The primary objective of this work is that trustworthy nodes, that is, nodes that 
provide good quality of service and are reliable from a security perspective, should survive 
in the network, whereas nodes which do not provide a good quality of service or are 
malicious should be detected quickly and removed from the network. This paper shows 
that these trust relationships help in removing malicious nodes from the network and that 
establishing trust relationships among the nodes in the network results in better 
performance and security in the network. The main contribution of this paper is the 
development of a trust model for ad hoc networks that takes into account attacks and 
intrusions, the availability of other nodes in the network as well as the quality of service 
provided other nodes. Section 2 discusses the related work in this area, in section 3, we 
present the proposed approach, section 4 evaluates the model with simulations and section 
5 concludes the paper. 
2 Related Work 
A number of trust models for ad hoc networks have been proposed. These include a 
number of approaches to establishing trust in routing protocols. In [9] a trust based 
adaptive on demand ad hoc routing protocol is proposed where based upon the trust that a 
node has on its neighboring node, a security level is implemented.  In this work the 
security level (or level of encryption) is defined by the level of trust between nodes. 
However, how the trust between nodes is determined is not discussed. A trust evaluation 
based security solution [16] is proposed to provide effective security decision for secure 
routing. Each node's evaluation of trust on other nodes is based on trust factors as 
experience statistics, data value, intrusion detection result, as well as node owner's 
preference and policy. In this model only direct experiences are considered and the 
experiences of other nodes is not taken into account. [17] dynamically updates trust levels 
by using reports from Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) located on all nodes in the 
network. The nodes neighboring to a node exhibiting suspicious behavior initiate trust 
reports. Using these trust levels as a guide, the source node then selects a route that meets 
the security requirements of the message to be transmitted. The trust is determined solely 
based on intrusions detected. Pirzada et al [10] propose a trust model based on analyzing 
network packet data. In particular, information such as passive acknowledgments, packet 
precision, blacklists, salvaging information and gratuitous route replies are examined. The 
DSR routing protocol [7] is extended to finding trustworthy routes. These protocols either 
increase the security or base trust on a factor such as intrusions detected, packet data etc. 
Our objective is to provide a dynamic trust evolution framework that is multi-dimensional, 
that is, the trust evolves depending on a number of factors. 
A number of models have also been proposed where the primary objective is not 
secure routing.  In the model proposed by Cr´epeau and Davis [4], the nodes in the ad hoc 
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network maintain profile tables. These tables can become large resulting in time 
consuming exchange of large profile tables. This work focuses on key management for 
certificate revocation rather than trust evolution. Trust is based on accusations received. In 
the model proposed by Capra [3] each node exchanges recommendation letters which 
describe the performance and satisfaction from the node in a specific context. We extend 
the recommendation mechanism proposed in this paper to include a probabilistic trust 
approach that is based on a number of factors including maliciousness of a node. 
Furthermore, the performance or the overheads associated with the approach is not 
discussed. Buchegger and Le Boudec [1] use a Bayesian network model to detect 
malicious nodes in a mobile Ad-hoc network on the basis of rumors spread by other nodes. 
They presented a mechanism to detect potential lies spread by other nodes. This work 
focuses on building trust based on rumors.  Theodorakopoulos and Baras [13] establishes a 
trust relationship among the nodes based on a theory of semirings. This paper presents a 
theoretical framework for establishing indirect trust relationships between two nodes 
without direct interaction. F. Ren et. al. [11] propose a probabilistic solution based on 
distributed trust model. A secret dealer is introduced in the system bootstrapping phase to 
complement the assumption in trust initialization. A robust trust chain in then constructed 
with high probability. This approach depends on a trustworthy secret dealer. The trust 
model described by Luo [6] is distributed in nature. The Certification authority is based on 
threshold cryptography [12]. In this model, each node in the network maintains a 
certificate revocation list, which contains a list of misbehaving nodes and its accusers. If 
the number of accusers are at least k (the threshold) then the node is marked as convicted 
otherwise it is marked as a suspect and the certificate is not renewed for a convicted node. 
Trust has also been investigated outside of ad hoc mobile networks. Zhu et. al. [18] 
present a proxy-based approach that uses alternative network channels to establish a secure 
trust relationship between communication parties to facilitate wireless communications 
between clients and services. A peer to peer trust model based on satisfaction of 
interactions is given in [14]. In this model there is no reference to the influence of 
malicious nodes on trust. Kagal et. al. have proposed an architecture for trust-based 
security in pervasive computing environments [19]. The architecture is agent-based and 
built on a role-based framework. 
To summarize, a lot of work has been done in trustworthy communications. Trust is 
typically determined from a security standpoint based on intrusions detected, direct 
experiences, recommendation from other nodes, accusations etc..  Theoretical models have 
been proposed and determining trust by analyzing data at the packet level have also been 
investigated. There is a need for a trust model that will evaluate trust on multiple criteria 
identified above. Furthermore the trust must evolve based on direct experiences, 
recommendations and other factors. Although all the above works address some aspect of 
trust, the work reported here provides an integrated framework for trust that benefits 
‘good’ nodes, but handicaps ‘bad’ nodes in a mobile ad hoc network. 
3 Trust Model 
The proposed trust model for certificate revocation described in this paper meets the 
following requirements:  
• A distributed trust framework  
• Trust is built over time as the number of interactions between nodes increase  
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• Trust in a node is defined not only in terms of its potential for maliciousness, but 
also in terms of the availability and quality of service it provides 
• Trust in nodes where there is little or no history of interactions is determined by 
recommendations from other nodes  
• If the nodes in the network are selfish, trust is obtained by an exchange of 
portfolios  
• The overhead in communications cost by the dissemination of trust information in 
the network is kept to a minimum.   
In a mobile ad hoc network, a source node communicates with a destination node through 
intermediate nodes. Nodes therefore need to establish trust only with the neighboring 
nodes with which they communicate directly. Hence trust is established along the path of 
communication. 
In our proposed model, we assume that a certificate authority issues private and public 
keys to every node that enters the network.  In other words, it is assumed that every node is 
initially trustworthy. A major objective of this work is to show that in the proposed model, 
nodes which although initially trustworthy, but have turned malicious will be detected and 
ejected from the network. Detecting such ‘insider’ malicious nodes is a major challenge for 
any security system.   
3.1  Model of trust 
In our proposed work, trust is within the range [0…1] where 1 indicates maximum trust 
and 0 indicates no trust at all.  Trust is a measure of two factors: 
• Satisfaction: A node that provides good quality of service (where quality may be 
defined in terms of response-delay, jitter for example) and is highly available (that is, 
the neighboring node is available for a long time, such as when the two nodes are close 
to each other and move in tandem) is more trustworthy than a node that provides poor 
quality and low availability. 
• Maliciousness: A node that is detected to be malicious is deemed to be highly 
untrustworthy. Some types of malicious activities are unacceptable and the trust in the 
target node is completely removed and set to 0, whereas other types of malicious 
activities may be more tolerable and the trust level is reduced, but not completely 
removed. A node which may be detected spoofing, for example, is defined to be 
completely untrustworthy and will be set to a trust of 0 (no trust at all).   
3.2 Trust Establishment 
Trust may be established in three ways in the ad hoc network: 
• Direct experience: A node can determine trust on a target node based on its previous 
experience with the target node. This previous experience is only valid for a certain 
period of time.  
• Seeking recommendation: If the node doesn’t have direct previous experience with the 
target node or if the experience is outdated the node seeks recommendations. The trust 
is formulated on the basis of the recommendations received from other nodes.  
• Inadequate trust formation: Devices that operate in an Ad hoc network are energy 
constrained. When a request is sent by a source node for recommendations about a 
particular node, a node may be selfish and not reply so as to conserve its energy. Due to 
lack of recommendations, the source node is thus unable to determine a reliable trust 
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level on a particular target node in the network even though the node may be a 
trustworthy node. Therefore, to deal with such a situation, an exchange of portfolios 
takes place. In other words, at the end or break of any communication between two 
nodes, they exchange a “credential” letter based on their experience with each other. 
Hence, when a node n has finished communication with a node x, the following 
exchange takes place: 
node n to node x:  
<<“n” trusts “x” , context c1, time ts> ,…,<“ n” trusts “x” , context ci, time ts>, K-n>. 
This means that node n trusts node x in the context ci at a time stamp ts. Context here 
can be either Quality of Service (QoS) or Availability (A). This credential letter is 
signed by the private key (K-n) of the node n, thus ensuring that a node will not send 
fake credentials. Similarly:  
node x to node n:  
<<“x” trusts “n” , context c1, time ts> ,…,<“ x” trusts “n” , context ci, time ts>, K-x>. 
Hence when a node encounters a situation where very few nodes reply to a request for 
recommendations, it directly requests the target node for the portfolio of credentials it 
has received from other nodes. The target node collects the credentials it has received 
and creates a “portfolio of credentials”. For example:  
<<a 0.5 y, A, 100>, <a  0.75 y, QoS, 100>,<c  0.25 y, A, 150>, <c  0.40 y, QoS, 100>  K-x>.  
Here node a trusts node y for half the communications to be trustworthy as far as 
availability is concerned and three-quarters for QoS.  Node c’s trust on node y is less.   
The source node makes a decision on trusting the target node based on the portfolios it 
receives from the target node.   
However a target node may send only selective portfolios to the requesting node. 
This is very difficult to detect. A partial solution is for the source node to check its local 
table for inconsistencies. For example, target node a sends node b its credentials 
received from nodes m and n. However b knows from prior portfolios it received from s 
that s has received a portfolio from a. Hence b knows that a has not sent it the portfolio 
it has received from s.  
An ad hoc network may be set up ‘on the fly’ and this calls for a key management 
scheme that is distributed and does not require a centralized key management authority. 
Although there are a number of such schemes available, each of these schemes require 
some common security parameter. For example, Zhang et. al. [22] propose a compromise-
tolerant security mechanism based on identity-based cryptography and bilinear pairing 
technology. This is a public/key key management scheme that does not require a 
centralized public key infrastructure and the public and private keys are generated by the 
individual nodes. Although this does not compromise the security of the network, it is 
assumed that the nodes are installed with a common master key at the beginning which can 
be deleted by the individual nodes once they have generated their public/private keys.  
In figure 1, arc 1, refers to the direct experience a node has with another node. This 
direct experience is based on the availability and quality of service. The satisfaction is 
derived from the availability and quality of service and then the trust is derived. A node is 
trustworthy if the satisfaction is above some threshold, otherwise it is not trustworthy. In 
arc 2, a node derives its trust on another node based on recommendations it receives from 
other nodes. In arc 3, a node determines the trust level based on the portfolio of credentials 
it receives from the target node. In arcs 4 and 5 an intrusion is detected. In the case of a 
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serious intrusion (arc 5), the trust is immediately set to 0, whereas in the case of a minor 
intrusion (arc 4) the trust level is reduced. 
 
 
Figure 1: Trust Model 
3.3 Intrusion detection unit 
Although quality of service and availability are a basis for trust, they do not take into 
account the maliciousness of nodes.  We therefore assume that each node has an intrusion 
detection unit (IDU) that signals when suspicious activity is detected. It is possible that the 
behavior of the suspect node may be perfectly legal, and it appears to be malicious due to 
interference or other problems. The aim of the proposed trust model is that “no innocent 
node should suffer and no malicious node should survive”. If the suspect node’s behavior 
is obvious for it to be marked as malicious, the source node floods the network with 
accusation messages against it. Nodes in the network which receive the accusation 
message completely remove their trust in the accused node if the message is flooded by a 
trustworthy node. On the other hand, if a node is only suspected to be bad, a neighboring 
node will only reduce its trust on the target node and will not flood an accusation. The 
objective of this paper is not to describe the IDU or how it works, hence we only outline 
the main types of attacks modeled in our simulations. 
DoS attack (Resource depletion): A simple resource depletion attack model very similar to 
the one described in [20] is followed where if the requests from a single node are identical 
and the requests exceed a threshold, an attack is signaled.  The IDS detects this scenario by 
maintaining a count of the number of packets that it receives from each node within a 
specific time window. If this count crosses a threshold, then an alert is signaled. For 
simulations, only data packets were transmitted. The IDS can be easily extended to cater 
for control packets. Figure 2 shows the state transition diagram for a resource depletion 
attack. On sniffing the first packet between the source and the destination, the node makes 
a transition from the initial state (INIT) to an intermediate state (IMT). In this state, both a 
counter and a timer are initialized. The counter is incremented for every packet the node 
observes between the same source and destination. If the count crosses a threshold within a 
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specific time interval, the node moves to ATC state and raises an alert. The trust on the 
misbehaving node is set to zero and an accusation is flooded in the network (ATC state). 
The counter is reset if the node observes an idle period for a substantial amount of time. 
 
Figure 2: DoS Model 
 
Time of response: This is a quality of service parameter caused by various factors such as 
congestion etc and is not a security attack due to malicious nodes. There is a maximum 
waiting time for a response when two nodes are communicating. A timer set to a timeout 
time T is initiated. The timer decrements and if no response is received with the timeout 
period T, the IDU will signal and the trust on the node is decreased. No accusation is 
flooded. 
 
Figure 3: Timer Response model 
 
Spoofing: As mentioned above, nodes exchange credentials (state EXC), which are signed 
by their private keys. If a node has been spoofing, the credentials cannot be read with the 
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public key. When the IDU detects a spoofed address, it signals. The trust on the node is 
completely removed and an accusation message is flooded in the network. This is the 
approach taken in our model, but this will not detect spoofing in individual packets. 
Various methods have been proposed for detecting spoofing attacks by analyzing each and 
every packet [20] [21].  
 
Figure 4: Spoofing model 
 
Hijacking attacks: A malicious node may pick on a victim to falsely accuse in order to 
remove it from the network. It achieves this by first compromising a node with which it 
communicates. The compromised node and the malicious node then both accuse an 
innocent node. The hijacking node repeats this until sufficient number of nodes accuse the 
victim so that it is removed from the network. A hijacking attack is difficult to detect. For 
our simulations we modeled a simple detector which raises a flag if the same subset of 
nodes make the same accusations repeatedly.  
 
Figure 5: Hijacking Model 
An accusation is received in state ACC1. A timer is started. If accusations by multiple 
nodes are received against the same node within the timeout period, then a comparison is 
made with a list that contains the nodes that made accusations against a node on previous 
occasions. This simple correlation is used to determine if nodes are acting in tandem to 
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make accusations and if such an event is determined, a flag is raised and the node floods 
the network with accusation messages. In our simple detector, an accusation by the 2 same 
nodes repeatedly was used to raise a hijacking flag. 
3.4 Trust Model 
In this work we use a Bayesian network to determine trust in the network. Each node 
maintains a Bayesian network for every other node in the network. A node in the network 
will communicate if it has trust on the target neighbor node. A Bayesian network is a 
relationship network that represents probability relationships between different nodes. A 
Bayesian network allows trust to be represented using probability which is updated 
whenever an interaction occurs between two nodes. A node may provide good quality of 
service, but poor availability. A probability representation that combines these two (or 
more) contexts of trust deals with such conflicts. The naive Bayes theorem is: 
)(
)(*)|()|(
eP
hPhePehP =                    (1) 
P (h) is called the prior probability of hypothesis and p(e) is the prior probability of 
evidence e. (h|e) is the probability of h given e; P(e|h) is the probability of e given h. 
Hence when all the values are supplied (i.e. prior probabilities) the Bayes theorem 
computes the posterior probability.                
3.4.1 Direct experience 
Each node maintains a table of the history of interactions with a target node. This is the 
history of the number of direct interactions with a particular node, as well as the history of 
the recommendations received from the node..   
 
Table 1: A table in the node’s local environment  
Direct Interactions Recommender Node_id 
lTotal Ia Iq ls Time stamp ts RTotal Ra Rq Rr 
A 3 1 1 1 10     
B 2 0 1 1 12     
C 5 5 5 5 15 2 1 1 1 
 
la - No of direct experience interactions in which the availability was satisfactory 
lq - No of direct experience interactions in which the QoS was satisfactory 
ls  -  No. of direct experience interactions that was satisfactory 
lTotal -  Total No. of direct experience interactions  
Ra – No. of correct recommendations for Availability  
Rq – No. of  correct recommendations for QoS 
Rr - No. of correct recommendations 
RTotal – Total No. of recommendations 
Each node defines its threshold for satisfaction. For example, during a communication if a 
neighboring node is available for a time that is greater than a threshold, the availability of that 
node is defined as satisfactory. However, for the same communication the QoS is below the 
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threshold for satisfaction. The corresponding entries la and lTotal in the above table is 
incremented whereas lq is not incremented. 
The performance of a particular node in the network is stored in the local environment 
(table 1). Conditional probability is used to find the satisfaction from availability. This is 
represented as follows: 
)1(
)1,""()1|""(
=
==
===
TP
TyAvalabilitAttributePTtyAvailabiliAttributeP                         (2) 
This measures the probability that the attribute is availability given that the interaction is 
satisfying.  Similarly for QoS one can determine that the attribute is QoS given that the 
interaction is satisfying.  
The probability that the interaction is satisfactory is defined as follows:  
Total
s
l
l
TP ===
nsinteractio of no  total
 nsinteractio  satisfying of no)1(                   (3) 
P(Attribute=”Availability”, T=1) is the no. of interactions in which the attribute 
availability was satisfactory for all the interactions that were satisfactory, that is, 
s
a
l
l
TtyAvailabiliAttributeP === )1,""(                (4) 
The probability that the node is trustworthy in providing Availability can be obtained using 
the naïve Bayes theorem (eq. (1)): 
AStyAvailabiliAttribureP
TPTtyAvailabiliAttributePtyAvailabiliAttributeTP =
=
===
===
)""(
)1(*)1|"()""|1(            (5) 
In eq (5) the probability that the attribute is Availability given that the interaction is 
satisfying is obtained from eq.(2).  The probability that the interaction is satisfactory is 
determined by eq (3). The probability that Availability is satisfactory is obtained from: 
Total
a
l
l
tyAvailabiliAttributeP ===
nsinteractio of no  total
ty Availabili  satisfying nsinteractio of no)""(            (6) 
Eq (5) shows the probability that the node is trustworthy in providing Availability. 
Similarly the probability that the node is trustworthy in providing QoS can be derived.   
The Bayesian model hence serves to build a trust level. After each interaction, a node 
updates its corresponding Bayesian networks. The parameters la, lq, ls are incremented 
appropriately in table 1 and lTotal is also incremented. These updated parameters are input to 
the Bayesian model when determining trust the next time. 
Each node has it own perception of trust; hence each node is free to give its own 
weight for the two parameters. The weight could be any value between [0,1]. A node 
updates its corresponding Bayesian networks after each interaction. Satisfaction for 
availability SA is derived from eq. 5 and similarly satisfaction for quality of service SQ can 
be derived. If the satisfaction is above a certain threshold, the node is deemed to be 
trustworthy and communication takes place. The overall degree of satisfaction with an 
interaction is computed as: 
n
stct
ASAWQSQWSonsatisfacti +
−
+
=
)**(
)(              (7) 
where: WQ:  weight for Quality of service 
SQ:  Satisfaction from the Quality of service 
WA:  weight for availability 
SA: Satisfaction from availability 
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ts: value of  timestamp of most recent experience 
tc: current time value 
n: a constant 
The weights WA and WQ  indicate the relative importance of availability and QoS. Satisfaction 
SA and SQ is a numerical measure of the satisfaction with the availability and the quality of 
service respectively. If satisfaction S is greater than or equal to a threshold then the node is 
trustworthy. This node may be selected for communication. All this information is stored in 
the local environment of the node. The value of timestamp indicates how recent the last 
experience of the node with the target node was. The more recent direct experiences are given 
higher weights. A constant n is chosen such that if the satisfaction level is good and then the 
probability of the node being classified as trustworthy is high.  This probability decreases as 
the most recent direct experience becomes older.  
3.4.2 Recommendations 
When a node receives from a source node a request for a recommendation on a target node, 
the node checks its Bayesian network and sends the recommendations for both Availability 
and Quality of Service. The source node then does two things: 
• It first computes a trust level for the target node based on the recommendations it 
receives.  
• At the end of the communication with a target node, it updates the trust level on the 
recommender, that is, can the recommender be trusted for a recommendation? Each 
node defines its satisfaction threshold for recommendations. For example, suppose 
node x receives a positive recommendation about a node y from a node z. After 
nodes x and y have completed communicating, and the interaction is above the 
threshold for satisfaction (that is, the interaction is satisfactory), the trust in node z 
as a recommender is increased.  Conversely, if the interaction was not satisfactory 
the trust in node z as a recommender is decreased.    
Each node therefore has two trust measures on a node x:  
• trust as a service provider which is determined by the source node’s direct 
experience with the target node  
• trust as a recommender which is determined by comparing the direct experience of 
a node with a target node and the recommendation received from node x about the 
target node.   
3.4.2.1 Computing trust level based on recommendations 
The node receives recommendation values on QoS and Availability from other nodes in the 
network. Some of the recommendations are from nodes with which the source node has had 
prior direct experience (‘prior’ nodes) or received previous recommendations 
(‘recommender’ nodes), whereas other recommendations are from nodes with which the 
source node has had no prior experience or has not received any recommendations 
(‘unknown’ nodes).  
If g recommendations are received from ‘unknown’ nodes, the recommendation value is 
calculated as:  
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where: tujQoS = The trust that zth  node (‘unknown’ node) has on jth node (target node) for 
QoS 
tujA - The trust that zth  node (‘unknown’ node) has on jth node (target node) for 
Availability 
wuQoS = weight given to references from ‘unknown’ nodes for QoS 
wuA = weight given to references from ‘unknown’ nodes for Availability 
If k recommendations are received from nodes with which the source node has had prior 
direct experience (‘prior’ nodes), the recommendation value is: 
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where: tplQoS - the trust that the source node has on lth  recommender (‘prior’ node) for QoS 
based on previous direct experience 
tplA - the trust that the source node has on lth recommender (‘prior’ node) for 
Availability based on previous direct experience 
tljQoS - the trust that lth node (‘prior’ node) has on j th node (target node) for QoS 
tljA - the trust that lth node (‘prior’ node) has on j th node (target node) for 
Availability 
wpQoS = weight given to references from ‘prior’ nodes for QoS 
wpA = weight given to references from ‘prior’ nodes for Availability 
The trust values are obtained from the trust tables in the respective nodes. 
If m recommendations are received from nodes from which the source node has received 
previous recommendations (‘recommender’ nodes), the recommendation value is: 
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where: trlQoS - the trust that the source node has on lth   recommender (‘recommender node’) for 
QoS based on previous recommendations from the lth node  
trlA - the trust that the source node has on lth   recommender (‘recommender’ node) 
for Availability based on recommendations from the lth node 
tljQoS - the trust that lth node (‘recommender’ node) has on jth node (target node) for 
QoS 
tljA - the trust that lth node (‘recommender’ node) has on jth node (target node) for 
Availability 
wrQoS = weight given to references from ‘recommender’ nodes for QoS 
wrA = weight given to references from ‘recommender’ nodes for Availability 
The trust values are obtained from the trust tables in the respective nodes. 
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More weight is given to direct experience or references from nodes which have supplied 
previous recommendations than to unknown references 
                              wpQoS + wpA + wuQoS + wuA + wrQoS + wrA = 1 
                                   wpQoS > wuQoS ; wpA > wuA, wrQoS > wuQoS ; wrA > wuA 
The total recommendation value is the sum of all the different recommendations and if the 
recommendation value is greater than or equal to a pre-defined threshold, communication 
takes place. 
3.4.2.2 Model for updating recommendations 
Each node also maintains a Bayesian network for each node to evolve trust on a 
recommender node. If a node’s recommendation is proven to be valid, that is, it is correct, 
its trust as a recommender is increased. When a node z replies to a requesting source node x 
its recommendations on a particular node y in the network, z sends the requesting node x 
uses the direct experience information about y that is stored about that node in its local 
environment.  
To determine that the recommender is node i given that the recommendation is 
correct for availability, that is,  
)1(
)1,""(
)1""(
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==|=
TP
TtyAvailabiliAttributeP
TtyAvailabiliAttributeP
irec
irec          (11) 
The probability that the recommendation is correct is defined as follows:  
Total
r
R
R
TP ===
tionsrecommenda of no  total
 tionsrecommendacorrect   of no)1(           (12) 
The probability that the recommender i is trustworthy in providing recommendations for 
availability can be obtained using the naïve Bayes theorem (eq. (1)): 
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eq (13) shows the probability that a node i is trustworthy in recommending availability.  
The probability that recommendation is correct is obtained from: 
Total
a
irec R
R
tyAvailabiliAttributeP ===
tionsrecommenda of no  total
ty Availabilifor  correct  tionsrecommenda of no)""( _             (14) 
Similarly the probability that a node i is trustworthy in recommending QoS can be 
determined.   
If a node’s recommendation is proven to be valid, its trust as a recommender is 
increased. The number of correct recommendations Rr, the total number of 
recommendations RTotal and the number of correct recommendations for Availability (Ra) 
and QoS (Rq) is incremented.  Hence each node maintains a trust record of recommenders 
and service providers (direct experience nodes) 
3.4.3 Accusation messages 
If a node x receives an accusation message accusing node y from a node n, node x 
either ignores the accusation message or completely removes its trust on the accused node, 
depending on the trust of the accuser n as a service provider (that is, the trust built as a 
result of direct interactions).  If node x has a low trust (below a threshold) value of the 
accuser n as a result of previous direct interactions (service provider) with node n, the 
accusation is simply ignored.  On the other hand, if the accuser n has a high trust (above 
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the threshold) value, the trust value on the accused node y is immediately set to zero, that 
is, no trust at all. This simple model can be further refined such that the degree of trust 
degradation in the accused is proportional to the trust level in the accuser.  
3.4.4 Certificate Revocation 
In the Ad hoc network, each node communicates only for the period the certificate is valid. 
Once the certificate expires, it has to be renewed.  The node broadcasts a request for 
certificate renewal. Based on threshold cryptography, it should get reply from at least k 
(threshold) nodes to renew its certificate. When a certificate is to be renewed the node that 
receives the request, replies with a request to the source node for a “Portfolio of 
credentials”. This defines the overall behavior of the node in the network during the 
previous certificate validity period. Suppose if a’s certificate needs to be renewed, it sends 
its request to all the other nodes. Then the node j on receiving a’s request for certificate 
renewal, requests a for its portfolio of credentials, that is, all the credentials it has received. 
It adds up all the trust values, if the trust is greater than or equal to threshold, then the 
partial certificate is given. The same procedure is repeated by each node that receives a 
request from a. If a is able to get k partial certificates it can form a valid certificate using 
threshold cryptography for communicating in the network [6]. Sometimes the node may 
have one or no recommendation, as it has participated in very few (if any) 
communications. In such a situation, the local environment of the node (node issuing the 
certificate) is checked to verify if there is any information about any misbehavior of the 
source or requesting node. If the node has misbehaved and is marked as convicted it is 
denied a certificate otherwise it is granted a certificate. 
3.5 Exchange of Credentials 
There are critical points at which credentials should be exchanged. In the first approach 
nodes should exchange credentials only after the session has ended. This is the approach 
taken in our simulations. This approach relies on the lower level communication protocols 
to compensate for packets that have been lost due to route breakage caused by mobility. No 
credentials are exchanged when there is a break in communications caused by mobility. 
The danger with this approach is that when there is a break in a link, one of the nodes in 
the communications may turn malicious. This may not be easily detected, especially if the 
majority of the communication took place when the node was not malicious. However, 
since the routing protocol is responsible for constructing a new path and this can typically 
be done quickly, the probability of a node becoming malicious is minimal. An alternative 
approach would try to exchange credentials when a route breakage is predicted. This 
approach will result in a more accurate measure of trust. Since credentials are exchanged 
before link breaks, this approach will detect malicious nodes faster, but incurs the penalty 
of increased overheads. In this approach, credentials are exchanged when there is a high 
probability of a break in the path. One possible solution to recognizing that a path may be 
about to break is the signal level, that is, to exchange credentials when the signal is below a 
threshold level.  However, although the signal between any two nodes in the path may be 
weak, they may be moving in parallel. This will result in a continuous exchange of 
credentials resulting in congestion and minimal message communications. 
 We outline a possible simple approach to detecting a break in the link. However 
more work is needed in this area. We define a “exchange region” which has three zones 
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called the prediction zone, adaptation zone and exchange zone (figure 6). The range of 
each zone is determined by the strength of the signal. The innermost zone is the prediction 
zone and the outermost zone is the exchange zone. The boundary between the adaptation 
zone and the exchange zone is dynamic, whereas all the other boundaries are fixed. The 
relative velocity of the nodes is determined by measuring the time elapsed for a node to 
travel relatively from the start of the prediction zone to the end of the prediction zone. If 
the velocity is maximum, an exchange of credentials takes place. Otherwise, an adaptation 
zone is defined, that is, a new signal strength defining the range of the adaptation zone is 
calculated. When the signal strength reaches the end of the adaptation zone an exchange of 
credentials takes place. Hence, a continuous exchange of credentials does not take place 
using this approach even if two nodes are moving in parallel. The different zones can be 
determined based on the received signal strength. The signal power of received messages 
can be used to estimate the distance between them. In [5] the signal power is determined to 
be  
4
0
r
P
Preceived =            (15) 
where r is the distance from the transmitter and P0  is the transmitted power which is a 
constant based on antenna gain and height. Various approaches for dealing with link and 
path breaks have been proposed, [23] for example.  
 
Figure 6: Predicting link breakage 
 
4 Simulations and Results 
We compare the proposed Bayesian Trust model with the distributed trust model described 
in [6]. In this model the distributed certification authority is based on threshold 
cryptography. Each node in the network maintains a certificate revocation list, which 
contains a list of misbehaving nodes and its accusers. As in our scheme, an accusation is 
flooded in the network against a node detected misbehaving. If the number of accusers are 
at least k (the threshold) then the node is marked as convicted otherwise it is marked as a 
suspect. The certificate is not renewed for a convicted node. Hence, as opposed to our 
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model, there is no gradual build-up of trust in this model; instead, when a threshold k of 
accusation is received, the node is removed from the network.    
Simulations show that as trust is gradually built up in the proposed model, fewer 
innocent nodes will have their certificate revoked and more malicious nodes will have their 
certificates revoked compared to the approach taken in [6]. Various attacks, Availability 
and Quality of service parameters are modeled in the simulation. The quality of service is 
defined by the response time. The performance of the proposed model and the model 
described in [6] under the influence of attacks is compared. The time taken to remove 
malicious nodes from the network by the two models is compared. The number of innocent 
nodes suffered in the two models is also compared. The amount of useful communication 
performed by the network in the two models is also compared. 
4.1 Ad hoc network model 
An ad hoc network consisting of a mixture of genuine and malicious nodes is modeled. 
Each node in the network has a unique ID. The nodes in the network are assumed to have 
entered the network and have acquired a certificate for communication. The Random 
waypoint mobility model [2] is chosen for this work. The threshold value ‘k’ is globally 
fixed. When two nodes communicate, the initiator of the communication will try to transfer 
a file to the destination. When a node wishes to communicate with a particular node in the 
network, it sends a request to the node and waits for the reply, where each node has its own 
reply time. A node may flood accusations or based upon its certificate validity it will 
communicate with other nodes in the network. If the certificate has expired it will send a 
request for renewal of the certificate. In the simulation of the Bayesian network trust model 
each node has its own weight for the two parameters of trust (availability, quality of 
service). For our simulations the two parameters are given equal weighting. The threshold 
values for satisfaction from a node is globally fixed. 
The following additional assumptions are made for the simulation: 
a) When the nodes initially enter into the network they  are granted certificates for 
communication 
b) Whenever a node receives a set of request for certificate, they are processed in the 
order they have arrived without giving any priorities. 
c) When a node is under DoS attack it will be freed from the attack once it is out of 
the proximity of the attacker. 
d) No nodes enter or leave the network for the duration of the simulation.   
e) All nodes are assumed to have the same battery life and other resources.   
f) When any node observes malicious activity, the node will flood the accusation in 
the network. 
g) For simulation purposes, only one hop neighbors reply to certificate requests  
The simulation program was written in the ‘C’ programming language on 
Microsoft.Net platform. A random waypoint model was used. For our simulations we used 
a constant file size of 100 KB, a network of 30 nodes in a 600m * 600m area, a pause time 
and a movement time with a maximum of 40 seconds, a data payload of 512 bytes per 
packet and a packet rate of 4 packets per sec. Each node has a communication range of 
250m. The simulations were run for 800s. Each session lasts far 40 seconds. Portfolios are 
exchanged at the end of the session and the next session starts. In our model half the nodes 
are generating traffic. Portfolios, recommendations and accusation messages are assumed 
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to consume 1 sec each. A spoofing attack takes place through an intermediate malicious 
node in the path forwarding a message. A malicious node of each type (spoofing, DoS, 
hijacking) was randomly selected to generate an attack in each session. The attacks 
continued until the nodes were detected and removed from the network. A timer was 
invoked to measure the availability of a node. For quality of service, some nodes had a 
larger response time than other nodes. A recommendation was requested by one of the 
good nodes randomly. Accusations were flooded each time a malicious node was detected 
and portfolios were exchanged at the end of a session. The overheads simulated included 
the flooding of accusations, the exchange of portfolios and the reception of 
recommendations. 
Two sets of simulations were run. In the first set 10% of the nodes were malicious, 
and in the second set 50% were deemed malicious. The attacker nodes were equally 
distributed between the different types of attacks. The simulations do not take into account 
routing overheads such as route discovery or packet losses. Future work will implement 
the proposed trust scheme on a network simulator such as ns-2. 
4.2 Results 
This section gives a comparison of the two trust models. In all the graphs below scheme1 
refers to the distributed trust model described in [6] and scheme2 is the proposed trust 
model. We simulated a file transfer as the communication in the network.   
4.2.1 Useful communication in the two trust models 
Useful communication is defined as the communication that transfers files as opposed to 
communicating recommendations, portfolios, credentials or accusations. A simple ‘back of 
the envelope’ analysis for useful communications is shown below. Useful communication 
is calculated as follows: 
Potential file transfer Fp: The file size that a node is capable of transferring based on its 
certificate validity period. 
Potential file transfer rate Fp = Download speed of a node = S (packets/s) 
However, due to overhead and other communications and the capacity of the receiver, the 
actual file size that is transferred may be less. We assume the a node can receive and 
transmit at the same rates and all nodes have the same capacity. 
Actual File transfer: The file size that a node is able to send is calculated as: 
Actual File transfer Fa = Fp – O              (16) 
Where O is the overhead packets incurred. 
Percentage of useful communication = (Fa / Fp) *100              (17) 
The actual file transfer is affected by the overheads 
There are three overheads: 
- Accusations. Given that on average the rate of accusations is λ accusations per 
second per node in the network and there are N nodes in the network where the 
average number of degrees of a node is δ, then the number of accusation packets 
generated per second in the network will be: 
 λN x Nδ = λN2δ               (18) 
 Accusations are flooded in the network 
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- Recommendations. Given that on average the rate of recommendations is ε 
recommendations per second per node in the network, the number of 
recommendation packets generated per second in the network will be: 
 εLN                 (19) 
 where L is the average route length in the network. Recommendations are not 
flooded, and are sent directly to the requestor.  
- Portfolios. Portfolios are exchanged at the end of a session. If N nodes are 
transferring a file of size M packets over a route of length L, the total packets 
transferred will be NLM. Taking into account the overheads, assume it takes γ time 
units to transfer the entire file. In other words, 
 γγεδγλ NSNLMLNN =++2  
 Therefore, per unit time: 
  NSNLMLNN =++
γ
εδλ 2              (20)
 Assuming a rate of portfolio exchange σ, which is one every session, the above 
approximates to 
  NSNLNLMLNN ≈+++
γ
σ
γ
εδλ 2  
Only 
γ
NLM is useful file transfer, the rest is overhead. Therefore per node, the useful 
communications per unit time is )(
γ
σ
εδλ LLNS ++−            (21) 
Therefore for each node the percentage of useful communication = (Fa / Fp) *100 
  100*
)(
S
LLNS
γ
σ
εδλ ++−
=              (22) 
This assumes that a file transfer takes more than one time unit. 
However this does not take into account the overheads caused by mobility. Mobility causes 
link breakage and given a link breakage rate µ, the following occur 
- Accusations. Accusations are re-flooded in the network at a rate that is related to λ 
and µ. The higher the value of µ, the higher the re-flooding rate 
- Recommendations. Recommendation are re-transmitted in the network at a rate that 
is related to ε and µ. The higher the value of µ, the higher the re-transmission rate 
- Portfolios. Portfolios are re-transmitted in the network at a rate that is related to σ 
and µ. The higher the value of µ, the higher the re-transmission rate 
The mobility rate therefore affects the associated overheads. The higher the mobility, the 
higher the overheads. A detailed analysis is not given as our simulations did not cater for 
the extra overhead packets due to link breakage. In our simulations we have assumed that 
link breakage is handled at lower levels which will retransmit as needed.  
 From (22), we can determine that the longer the sessions, the smaller the overheads 
due to portfolio exchanges. The overheads due to accusations is related to the size of the 
network N. The rate of accusations λ is related to the number of malicious nodes in the 
network. The exact rate of accusations is a function of the trust mechanism employed. The 
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route length affects the overheads due to recommendations and portfolio exchanges. The 
frequency of attacks (as indicated by λ), recommendations requested (as indicated by ε), 
also affect the overheads. 
Useful Communications, 10m/s
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Figure 7: Comparison of useful communications at 10 m/s 
  Figure 7 compares the percentage of useful communication in the two models at 
10m/s with different percentages of malicious nodes. The graph is as expected from the 
above simple analysis. From the graph above we can see that scheme2 achieves a higher 
percentage of useful communication when compared to scheme1 particularly when the 
percentage of malicious nodes in the network is high. This is because in scheme1 the 
nearest node is selected for communication whereas in scheme2 a node is selected based 
on its trust levels for availability and quality of service. The results also show that the 
overhead is higher when the number of malicious nodes is more. The speed of movement 
does not appear to impact the percentage of useful communications for scheme 2 as 
expected. This is because the lower level protocols compensate for packet losses caused by 
mobility. One would expect an increase in the overheads at high mobility if there is an 
exchange of portfolios every time a path breakage is expected. These results also indicate 
that although there is some overhead in the proposed approach, it is acceptable. The 
overhead is a function of the frequency of attacks and the number of malicious nodes in the 
network. The useful communication is lower initially because as expected, there is little 
prior experience in the network and more recommendations are requested. Moreover is 
scheme 2 malicious nodes are detected quickly resulting in many accusation messages 
initially. Once the network has settled down, the number of recommendations reduces. The 
results are very similar for 2m/s, but a little better. We have employed a high frequency of 
attacks and a large number of malicious nodes in the network. The overheads are therefore 
likely to be less in a more realistic scenario. The next set of results show that the proposed 
model performs well in the detection of malicious nodes  
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4.2.2 Number of true positives - Malicious nodes detected and removed 
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Figure 8: Comparison of malicious nodes detected at 10 % malicious nodes 
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Figure 9: Comparison of malicious nodes detected at 50% malicious nodes 
When 10% or 50% of the nodes are malicious, all the malicious nodes are removed in 
scheme2 – they are detected fairly rapidly and mobility of the nodes are does not seem to 
affect the rate of detection. Even at 50% all the malicious nodes are detected quickly.  In 
scheme1 all the malicious nodes are nodes are not detected, particularly at low speeds. This 
is because at low speeds malicious nodes come into contact with a limited number of nodes 
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and the rate of detection is much slower. In scheme2, even if the mobility is low, a single 
trustworthy node may get enough experience to make an accusation and the malicious 
node will be detected, whereas in scheme1 at least k nodes have to make the accusation. 
Hence mobility is favorable to node detection in scheme 1. 
4.2.3 Number of false positives – Good nodes detected and removed 
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Figure 10: Comparison of good nodes detected as malicious at 10 m/s 
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Figure 11: Comparison of good nodes detected as malicious at 2 m/s 
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 The graph in figure 10 shows the number of well behaving nodes remaining in the 
two schemes at node mobility 10m/s. In both schemes a number of innocent nodes are 
wrongly classified as malicious and ejected from the network. The difference in the two 
schemes is striking with scheme2 having significantly fewer false positives than scheme1, 
particularly when the number of malicious nodes is high.  
 It is interesting to note that at low speeds (fig 11 - 2m/s), scheme1 performs better 
than scheme2 initially. This is because in scheme1 a node is not removed from the network 
unless k or more nodes accuse it. This takes time. In contrast in scheme2, a single message 
from a trusted node is sufficient to remove a node in the network. However as the network 
stabilizes, scheme2 shows fewer false positives. In contrast, at high speeds nodes come 
into contact with different nodes much more often. At high speeds, hijacking nodes have 
more opportunity to capture other nodes and flood the network with accusation messages 
This results in more nodes making accusations which means that at high speeds scheme1 
performs poorly. The proposed scheme (scheme2) effectively removes hijacking nodes 
early in the communication. However, even in scheme2, the number of false positives is 
not completely eliminated and good nodes are detected as being malicious.  
5 Conclusions 
This work shows that the proposed network trust model provides a good trust model both 
from a service point of view (availability and quality) and a security perspective. 
Communicating with nodes that are within communications range and are trustworthy is 
preferred over communicating with nodes that are nearest neighbors, but less trustworthy. 
Certificate revocation is a function of quality of service and maliciousness. The percentage 
of useful communication in the network is improved by introducing context specific trust 
relationships among the nodes. The intrusion detection system of each node combined with 
the trust relationships with the other nodes effectively removes malicious nodes in the 
network. The objective of improving useful communications, maximizing the removal of 
malicious nodes and minimizing the removal of innocent nodes from the network is 
realized by the proposed trust model. 
Future work will investigate adding more parameters to availability and quality of 
service for the derivation of trust. Not considered at all in this work is the expenditure of 
energy in this model. An optimization model for energy consumption and trust is needed. 
Performance overheads caused by the Bayesian model and the modeling of trust under the 
influence of noise is another area for future work. Fairness in the model needs to be 
considered. The extension of the model to cater for a network where credentials, 
accusations, and recommendations themselves cannot be trusted is an important area that 
needs more work.  Other areas for future work include a more precise definition of 
experience and detecting nodes which may send only partial portfolios. Implementing the 
proposed scheme on a network simulator such as ns-2 or OPNET is also worth considering 
to take into account routing and other overheads including packet loss. 
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